Buddhists are Unfilial? — A Comparative Study on Buddhist and Confucian Filial Piety
Introduction
During its introduction to China in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Buddhism encountered radical opposition from the dominant indigenous school of philosophy, Confucianism, focal one of which pertains to the notion of filial piety — xiao 孝, whose first emergence dates back to Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE) (Chan and Tan 2004, 1) and which has long been profoundly established in Chinese culture and mentality, for that multiple Buddhist practices and principles contain seeming irreconcilable differences as to Confucian filial piety[1] (Guang 2012, 75). Despite strenuous defences from Buddhists and scholars and the increased acceptance and integration of Buddhism into Chinese society, critical debates on the subject remain ongoing. Thus, this article serves as an attempt to contend that Buddhism, from the lens of unpoliticised Confucian filial piety, is, in essence, filial.
Confucian filial piety
Situated in the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 BCE) wherein major hostilities between feudal states were frequent and the traditional propriety disintegrated, Confucius (551–478 BCE) inherited propriety practices from the Zhou dynasty (1045?–221 BCE), which he deemed China’s heyday, a time when moral sovereigns, loyal ministers, and decent people maintained social harmony via practising propriety (Gardner 2014, 1) and subsequently devised a sociopolitical school of philosophy, Confucianism, that aimed at addressing pressing businesses, e.g., to regulate inter-state tensions and revive previous peace and prosperity through an emphasis upon subjects’ disciplined propriety of conduct in the rigid social hierarchy (Sin 2020, 210). Despite repeated failures and disappointments as a result of the aggressiveness and the ultimate ambition to unite China of rulers, he travelled across the states with a mission to prevail upon receptive sovereigns to adopt his approach and later, shifted his focus from politics to education (Gardner 2014, 3), cultivating influential devoted disciples and contributing to the birth of much Confucian literature. Followed by the promotion and further development by Confucians such as Mencius (372–289 BCE) and perhaps most crucially, the substantial support from Han sovereigns, Confucianism flourished (Gardner 2014, 4–5).
Amongst numerous principles in Confucianism, filial piety is the primacy that is of the utmost moral significance and takes precedence over judicial and ethical matters (Sin 2020, 213) in that it is the bedrock of morality teaching and benevolence (ren 仁), one of the Five Constant Virtues 五常 (Hsu et al. 2009, 159). Filial piety concentrates on the inseparability of family, which is reflected in traditional Chinese cosmology in the belief that one’s life is, in fact, the continuation of the physical lives of their parents, a belief that was frequently reaffirmed and accentuated in classical Confucian texts such as Li Chi[2] and the Confucian conceptualisation of the family being the human body[3]; the top-down configuration of the analogical body is essentially a miniature of the hierarchical familial fabric (Hwang 1999, 169–170), which is a miniature of the entire hierarchical social fabric underlined by Confucians as aforementioned; in other words, the family is a model for the state. Filial piety, moreover, aside from superior respect, favours intimacy to the extent that family members are obliged to proffer each other assistance when required for that failure of a body part would eventually result in the collapse of the entire body (Hwang 1999, 170). The overall stability and unity of the family are politicised and is considered to have a significant bottom-up influence: interpersonally from sons — zi 子 to fathers — fu 父 (filial piety) in a family setting and from ministers — chen 臣 to sovereigns — jun 君[4](loyalty — zhong 忠) in a court setting and geographically from families to villages, from villages to townships, …, from cities to the state, and ultimately, serves as a societal cement.
However, it is noteworthy that in Confucianism, father-son and sovereign-minister relationships are fundamentally distinct in that parents are the origin of one’s life and their relationships are blood-tied, whereas sovereign-minister relationships are primarily political in nature (Hwang 1999, 176); children must obey and respect the will of their parents. The difference is manifested in the offer of corrective advice; in father-son:
In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur. (The Analects: Li Ren; translated by James Legge; Sturgeon 2019)
And in sovereign-minister:
Zi Lu asked how a ruler should be served. The Master said, “Do not impose on him, and, moreover, withstand him to his face.” (The Analects: Xian Wen; translated by James Legge; Sturgeon 2019)
It is palpable that direct offence could be meant to the sovereign when necessary. By deduction, as opposed to the father-son relationship, the bond between the sovereign and ministers is not inseparable and permanent but subject to changes according to circumstances. This is, furthermore, proved by Mencius, who elucidated such a distinction in response to King Hsun of Chi’s inquiries pertaining to the office of ministers; Mencius responded that ministers with different surnames to the prince, indicating the absence of blood connection, could determine subsequent courses of action based on the principle of “the people are the most important element in a nation; […] the sovereign is the lightest” (The Works of Mencius — Meng Zi: Jin Xin II) after the prince committed severe offences and yet, ignored sincere admonitions (Hwang 1999, 176).
As to how to enact filial piety, Confucian literature such as Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao Jing 〈孝經〉) encompasses exhaustive discussion. Common practices include preservation of one’s body (e.g., hair and skin), which is the starting point of being filial[5], holding parents in reverence[6], parental maintenance[7], provision of proper funeral arrangements[8], and establishment of one’s character (glorification of parents), which is the ultimate objective of filial piety[9]. Such practices are ranked in a hierarchy with some practices of lower level than others which denote a lower level of filial piety. However, notwithstanding the primary emphasis on parent-children interactions, in early discourses on filial piety, the notion as an entirety has undergone politicisation. As in Xiao Jing, numerous chapters, such as Filial Piety in High Ministers and Great Officers and even in the beginning chapter — The Scope and Meaning of the Treatise[10], are an explicit statement that extends filial piety to official/ministerial piety, perhaps better known as loyalty. Confucian classics have morphed filial piety into a political instrument that ensures social stability, shifting the focal familial peace and reciprocity to sovereign-centric obedience. Thereby, in essence, filial piety under the Confucian philosophy is intrinsically political, providing societal homoeostasis in the face of violent political upheavals in late Zhou.
Buddhist violations against Confucian filial piety
The introduction of Buddhism to China provoked outright confrontations with Confucianism. One of the most debated facets is on filial piety that is believed to be profoundly popular amongst commoners, many of which habituated in remote villages, for that unlike other forms of propriety practices which requires literacy, a certain level of education, or even cultural and ritual sophistication, filial piety per se is easily accessible and practicable. The quintessential Buddhist life embraces habits, mentality, and philosophical pursuits that are alien to Chinese people and aberrant to Confucian filial piety. Thereby, this section is dedicated to investigating Buddhist infractions in terms of their physical life, behaviours towards parents, and philosophical priorities.
With respect to the Buddhist physical life, according to Gu Huan’s 顧歡 (425?–488? CE) Barbarian and Chinese — Yixia Lun 〈夷夏論〉, three of the apparent Buddhist infractions concern the appearance, namely the cutting of hair, funeral arrangements, i.e., cremation and burial at sea, and pravrajyā[11] 出家 of Buddhists (Guang 2010a, 254–255). As written in Xiao Jing, one is in receipt of their body, hair and skin included, from parents and protecting one’s body from damage is the commencement of filial piety; thus, the traditional Chinese custom was to retain one’s long hair, and any acts that cause destruction to the appearance and body is thus considered unfilial. In addition, the earlier mentioned Chinese cosmological belief that one’s life is a parental life continuation; therefore, harming oneself is equivalent to harming their parents which is doubtlessly unfilial. In a similar fashion, Buddhist adoption of cremation, which involves corpse incineration, and sea burial, which results in bodily destruction due to mauling of fish, are unfilial, in contrast to the Chinese custom of burying intact corpses in coffins (Guang 2010a, 255). Pravrajyāencompasses the abandonment of familial life and ancestral worships, evasion of taxation, and the construction of monasteries which fail to fulfil the requirements of filiality, i.e., service to parents — not caring for their daily lives — and to the ruler — not supporting state management through reduced taxation and increased government expenditure (Guang 2010a, 255–256). Other violations of this sort include celibacy, which induces the absence of posterity (Ch’en 1968, 82; Guang 2010a, 250; Guang 2013, 24–25), for the sake of the cessation of dukkha 滅諦, one of the catvāri āryasatyāni(the Four Noble Truths 四聖諦) and ultimately nirvāṇa (涅槃). It is deemed the gravest infringement of filial piety in Confucianism as articulated by Mencius[12], despite divergent interpretations of the original text (鄭 2010, 150; 趙2016, 111). The lack of posterity jeopardises the continuance of the long ancestral line, cosmologically injuring parental bodies and thus, giving rise to unfiliality.
Another category of violations is the behaviours towards parents. Confucianism underlines the utmost reverence and absolute obedience to parents[13]; even when parents commit mistakes and disregard constructive advice, one must maintain respectful manners without resentment, remain obedient yet apprehensive, and enact right on their behalf so that parents are kept happy (Guang 2013, 24–26). In contrast, the Buddhist approach, according to the Kataññu Sutta〈感恩經〉, is to advise and encourage parents to perform good deeds proactively and convert parents to faith, morality, liberality, and wisdom with respect should they lack such qualities, which departs from the Confucian approach of absolute obedience and passiveness, with the stipulation that filial advice should only be offered when parents are liable to err (Guang 2013, 29–30). This seemingly slight dissimilarity, if not a precise breach, is owing to the fundamental differences between the two schools of philosophy. Buddhism focuses on the doctrine of karma which demonstrates the performance of good deeds leads to positive vipāka (fruit) — positive outcomes in the present life and subsequent lives (Guang 2013, 29), as opposed to Confucianism which discourages and avoids discussions of and beyond death[14].
Following the discussion on their foundational differences, the last category that will be surveyed in this article pertains to philosophical priorities. Confucianism regards filial piety as the founding principle for that familial morality determines societal morality, whereas in spite of teaching filial piety as an essential ethical behaviour, Buddhism locates the epicentre of ethics at karma (Guang 2005, 84; Guang 2013, 30). Confucian filial piety is the root and the noblest form of benevolence with reference to Confucian classics[15]; on the contrary, in lieu of prioritising filial piety, (early) Buddhism[16] stresses karma, a wholly individual responsibility, is the origin of ethics; one suffers from poor karma even if their responsible deeds are for the sake of parents[17] (Guang 2013, 30–33). Such a focus accentuates the liberation and significance of individuals, and it may be anticipated that potential, both internal and external, conflicts over discussions and decisions on the matter within families, e.g., whether to favour individual liberation over the well-being of the family, and by Confucian deduction, states, posing a threat on familial and state integrity, which is a sign of unfiliality.
Buddhist filial piety
Having discussed multiple Buddhist transgressions of several dimensions, the remaining section is a rebuttal of Buddhist filial impiety. Thus far, the discussion has been focused on the Confucian filial piety, which is from the beginning, politicised as previously mentioned, and Buddhism appears to be unfilial from a Confucian standpoint. The two ideologies are incompatible by nature and confrontations are never resolved due to the fact that they are two separate and distinctive philosophical orientations to life, according to Professor Chung-Ying Cheng (Guang 2012, 76). Nonetheless, the following attempt to provide a novel perspective to assess the filiality of Buddhism based on an unpoliticised form of Confucian filial piety, that is purely familial-centric. Regardless that the credibility may be in question since this approach, unlike conventional analyses, is devoid of considerations of historical contexts and framework, it would be unjust for Buddhism to be evaluated without any adjustments or manipulation otherwise. This is an unorthodox yet eclectic approach.
The historical rebuttals written by Mouzi 牟子 (170–? CE), with reference to both Confucian and Daoist literature, of criticisms against Buddhism concerning filial piety in his Mouzi Lihuolun 〈牟子理惑論〉 are instrumental resources to authenticate Buddhist filiality. A significant argument of his is that no denunciation of practices somewhat similar to the Buddhists from Confucians was noted but only acclaim for virtuous conduct (Guang 2010a, 250). Taibo 泰伯 (?–?), despite his cutting of hair and tattooing of body – damaging one’s physical body, i.e., a blatant violation of Xiao Jing — as conforming to the local customs of the regions Wu 吳 and Yue 越 to refuse the crown for avoidance of violent scramble, was credited by Confucius to be of the greatest virtue (Guang 2010a, 250). Furthermore, the starvation of Bo Yi 伯夷 (?–?) and Shu Qi 叔齊(?–?) that results in the absence of posterity due to deliberate refusal of consuming Zhou 周 produce, which is comparable to the celibacy without posterity of Buddhist clerics, for the sake of maintaining loyalty and righteousness (Yi 義) is in receipt of approval and praise from Confucius (Guang 2010a, 250). The two instances explicitly illustrate the possible justifiability of deeds that seemingly infringe filial piety.
As contended by Ming Sengshao 明僧紹 (?–?), those who injure their body could potentially be sinless for that good and bad lies in one’s conduct, rather than their appearance and customs (Guang 2010a, 255). It is the degree of virtuousness that determines one’s filiality as its ultimate objective (the end of filial piety) is to establish their character (achieve fame) and thus glorify their parents forever, according to Xiao Jing. In Buddhism, monastic celibacy and removal of hair are rudimentary practices that idealistically assist in the attainment of moral perfection, individual liberation, and eventually, the cessation of dukkha (nirvāṇa). During the journey and upon completion of the ultimate object, monks will be able to redeem their ancestors (seven generations of the departed) and family, including parents, enacting the highest level of filial piety despite sacrifices of minor filial acts; as stated by Sun Chuo 孫綽 (314–371 CE), the Buddha, who achieved the highest level of filial piety by converting his father and illuminating his homeland, is an ideal exemplar (Guang 2010a, 251; 256). In the same sense, Buddhist behaviours towards parents can then be pardoned and justified since active admonition is for the parents’ sake so that performance of good deeds that result in positive vipāka due to karma is ensured, rescuing their lives. In addition, with reference to Buddhist sūtra, Qisong 契嵩(1007–1072 CE) described filial piety as the beginning of Buddhist precepts, which are equivalent to the five virtues of benevolence in Confucianism (Guang 2010a, 258), demonstrating the Buddhist emphasis on filial piety; the practice of precepts for the sake of teaching parents to reach virtues is, moreover, a means to cultivate virtues and laud one’s parents, embodying filial piety. Likewise, the Buddhist cosmology also allows the possible attainment of filial piety of a higher level than in Confucianism via loving and respecting all sentient beings (Guang 2010a, 258), which may be the reincarnation of one’s parents. Hence, scholars such as Guang (2010a: 248) contends that in some sense, Buddhist filial piety transcends the reach of Confucian filial piety.
The concluding part of the session will discuss Buddhist scriptures, stories, and parables on and popularise the subject of filial piety. New festivals are created and impact on traditional Chinese festivals, with the introduction of Chinese translations of Buddhist sūtras, one of the earliest and best known being the Ullambana Sūtra 〈盂蘭盆經〉, which documents the prominent story — a filial practice — of how on the fifteenth day of the seventh month of the lunar calendar, Maudagalyāyana 目連, the Buddha’s disciple, successfully redeemed his departed mother, who had become a hungry ghost that is punished to be unable to consume any food due to negative karma, by following the advice of the Buddha, i.e., to provide offerings to monks, and contributes to the birth of the well-received Yulanpen festival and influenced the Daoist Zhongyuan 中原 festival (Ch’en 1968: 86; Guang 2010b: 130–131). The Ullambana Sūtra was a robust defence, which wins rapid prevalence amongst Chinese people due to its intimate association with doctrinal filial piety and ancestral worship, against Confucian censure (Guang 2011,124). It would be counterintuitive and illogical to repudiate the filiality in Buddhism for that Buddhist literature indubitably facilitates the dissemination of filial piety.
Nevertheless, one must acknowledge the extension of Buddhist filial piety is confined and does not fulfil the specific political functions that politicised Confucian filial piety documented in Confucian literature does, although Buddhism serves other political purposes, such as induce docility and submission of people (Wright 1957: 28–29); henceforth, it is sensible to claim that through the lens of politicised Confucian filial piety, Buddhism is unfilial. However, all violations proposed in the last session aside from those pertaining to loyalty and sovereignty are rationalised; consequently, from the unpoliticised, familial-centric standpoint, Buddhism is, in essence, filial.
Conclusion
This article began with, in the first session, an overview of the historical context and included a brief discussion of Confucian filial piety, followed by an enumeration of possible Buddhist violations and elucidation in the second session, and eventually refuted Buddhist filial impiety based on unpoliticised Confucian filial piety in the third session, thereby attesting the filiality in Buddhism. Due to the litmited length, only a restricted scope of Buddhist and Confucian filial piety is, however, explored. Notwithstanding, it is evident that the confrontations between Buddhism and Confucianism have generated intriguing and substantial cultural-philosophical interactions and interexchange which have sparked heated discussions. Research gaps in the fundamental differences between the two schools of philosophy with an additional regard to politicalisation are discernible. Further close scrutiny and comparative studies on classical treatises should be conducted to elicit representative insights and assessments, e.g., on differences in terms of activeness/passiveness between Buddhism and Confucianism. It is equally notable to probe into the attitudes and examinations of historical academics to identify any potential prejudice that might jeopardise research credibility, for instance, via the means of literature reviews and citations.
[1] This terminology is to disambiguate filial piety in Confucianism from filial piety from other cultures such as Indian.
[2] “Individuals are given a body by their parents, when they die and return to the earth as a whole body, they are praised as ‘filial’. Taking good care of one’s body, and being prudent in personal conduct can be termed ‘piety’. One should not do anything dangerous with one’s body as it is inherited from one’s parents. One should not forget one’s parents when speaking out; if one never says bad words, one need never be insulted by others in anger. If one never does anything dangerous to one’s body, and never does anything to cause one’s parents to be insulted, one’s conduct can be termed filial piety.”
[3] “Father and son are one body; husband and wife, brothers, are all one body. The relationship between father and son is like that between head and feet. Husband and wife are a combination of two separate parts of one body; brothers are the four limbs.” (Li Ji: Chapter on Mourning Dress)
[4] Son-father and minister-sovereign relationships are two of the Five Cardinal Relationships — wulun 五倫.
[5] “Our bodies — to every hair and bit of skin — are received by us from our parents, and we must not presume to injure or wound them. This is the beginning of filial piety.” (Xiao Jing: The Scope and Meaning of the Treatise)
[6] “Zeng-zi said, ‘There are three degrees of filial piety. The highest is the honouring of our parents; the second is the not disgracing them; and the lowest is the being able to support them.’” (Li Ji: The Meaning of Sacrefices)
[7] “[T]hey are careful of their conduct and economical in their expenditure — in order to nourish their parents. This is the filial piety of the common people.” (Xiao Jing: Filial Piety in the Common People)
[8] “That parents, when alive, be served according to propriety; that, when dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and that they should be sacrificed to according to propriety.” (The Analects: Wei Zheng)
[9] “When we have established our character by the practice of the (filial) course, so as to make our name famous in future ages and thereby glorify our parents, this is the end of filial piety.” (Xiao Jing: The Scope and Meaning of the Treatise)
[10] “[Filial piety] commences with the service of parents; it proceeds to the service of the ruler; it is completed by the establishment of character.” (Xiao Jing: The Scope and Meaning of the Treatise)
[11] “The act of leaving the world and adopting an ascetic lifestyle.” (“pravrajya.” Oxford Reference; Accessed 30 Nov. 2021. https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100342183.)
[12] “There are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them.” (Meng Zi: Li Lou I)
[13] “Meng Yi asked what filial piety was. The Master said, ‘It is not being disobedient.’” (The Analects: Wei Zheng)
[14] “[The master replied,] ‘While you do not know life, how can you know about death?’” (The Analects: Xian Jin)
[15] “Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives (parents).” (Li Ji: Zhong Yong)
[16] Later development of Buddhism is not included since Zongmi宗密 (780–841) in the Tang dynasty considers filial piety also as the foundation of Buddhism as an attempt reconcile Buddhism with Confucianism (Guang 2013, 32).
[17] “[Someone] were to be contrary to the Dhamma, to behave unrighteously for the sake of his parents, and then because if such behaviour the wardens of the hell were to drag him off to hell.” (Dhanañjānīsutta 陀然經)
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